## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

## SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUMMARY ORDERS FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1 AND FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. IN A BRIEF OR OTHER PAPER IN WHICH A LITIGANT CITES A SUMMARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A CITATION APPEARS, AT LEAST ONE CITATION MUST EITHER BE TO THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE NOTATION: "(SUMMARY ORDER)." A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF THAT SUMMARY ORDER TOGETHER WITH THE PAPER IN WHICH THE SUMMARY ORDER IS CITED ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS THE SUMMARY ORDER IS AVAILABLE IN AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE WHICH IS PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEE (SUCH AS THE DATABASE AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.CA2.USCOURTS.GOV/). IF NO COPY IS SERVED BY REASON OF THE AVAILABILITY OF THE ORDER ON SUCH A DATABASE, THE CITATION MUST INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THAT DATABASE AND THE DOCKET NUMBER OF THE CASE IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS ENTERED.

1	At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2	for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moyniha
3	United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4	New York, on the $14^{ ext{th}}$ day of March, two thousand eight.
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6	PRESENT:
7	HON. RALPH K. WINTER,
8	HON. GUIDO CALABRESI,
9	HON. PETER W. HALL,
10	Circuit Judges.
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12	LIXIA CHEN,
13	Petitioner,
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15	v. 07-2223-ag
16	NAC
17	MICHAEL B. MUKASEY,
18	UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 1
19	Respondent.
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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Michael Mukasey is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales as a respondent in this case.

FOR PETITIONER: Scott E. Bratton, Cleveland, Ohio.

FOR RESPONDENTS: Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney
General; Barry J. Pettinato,
Assistant Director; Tim Ramnitz,
Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, U.S. Department of

Justice, Washington, D.C.

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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED, in part, and DISMISSED, in part.

14 Petitioner Lixia Chen, a native of the People's 15 Republic of China, seeks review of an April 26, 2007 order 16 of the BIA affirming the September 15, 2005 decision of Immigration Judge ("IJ") Robert D. Weisel denying 17 18 petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of 19 removal, relief under the Convention Against Torture 20 ("CAT"), and cancellation of removal. In re Lixia Chen, No. 21 A73 163 692 (B.I.A. Apr. 26, 2007), aff'q No. A73 163 692 22 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 15, 2005). We assume the 23 parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and 24 procedural history in this case.

When the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ and supplements the IJ's decision, this Court reviews the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen

- 1 v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). This Court reviews the agency's factual findings, including adverse 2 3 credibility determinations, under the substantial evidence standard, treating them as "conclusive unless any reasonable 4 5 adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see, e.g., Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 6 7 386 F.3d 66, 73 & n.7 (2d Cir. 2004) overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 494 8 9 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc). However, we will 10 vacate and remand for new findings if the agency's reasoning 11 or its fact-finding process was sufficiently flawed. Cao He 12 Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 406 (2d Cir. 13 2005); Tian-Yong Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 14 2004).
- 15 As an initial matter, while Chen did not properly raise 16 asylum, withholding of removal or CAT before the BIA, see 8 17 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), her failure to exhaust is excused because the BIA's decision specifically addressed Chen's 18 asylum claim, the denial of which served as the basis for 19 20 the denial of her withholding of removal and CAT claims. See Xian Tuan Ye v. DHS, 446 F.3d 289, 296-297 (2d Cir. 21 22 2006); Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 515 n.7 (2d Cir. 1994).

However, Chen did not argue before the agency that she had a well-founded fear of persecution based on the forcible insertion of an IUD; thus, Chen failed to exhaust this argument and we need not consider it. Steevenez v.

Gonzales, 476 F.3d 114, 117-118 (2d Cir. 2007).

The record supports the agency's finding that Chen failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution because her claim was "entirely speculative." See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005). The agency properly determined that Chen's testimony regarding the experience of Chen's mother, who was forcibly sterilized after having four children, was not probative of Chen's fear of persecution based on having one U.S.-born child. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004) (providing that an objective fear of persecution is "dependent upon the context and believability [the applicant] can establish for h[er] claims through presentation of reliable, specific, objective supporting evidence").

Because claims for withholding of removal and CAT require objective evidence of future persecution, see  $INS\ v$ . Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987), the agency's

finding that Chen had failed to prove the objective
reasonableness of her fear necessarily precluded success on
her applications for withholding of removal and relief under
the CAT. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.
2006).

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Finally, we dismiss Chen's challenge to the agency's denial of cancellation of removal. Chen argues that she is not challenging the discretionary determination of whether the hardship standard has been met, but rather is challenging "the Agency's failure to articulate and properly apply the legal standard for cancellation of removal." However, it is clear from Chen's arguments that she is challenging the agency's discretionary balancing of the facts. See Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 132, 135 n.3, 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (amended January 25, 2008)<sup>2</sup> ("[D]espite the nomenclature used by Barco-Sandoval, his assertion that he should have obtained cancellation of removal under the applicable legal standard constitutes a 'mere[ ] quarrel[ ] over the factual findings or justification for the discretionary choices' made by the agency, a quarrel that we lack jurisdiction to review.").

 $<sup>^{2}\</sup>mbox{The case, as amended, does not yet appear in the Federal Reporter.}$ 

1	Chen argues that the agency did not consider country
2	conditions or the fact that she will be forced to pay
3	tuition to send her daughter to school in China in denying
4	her application and that she did establish the requisite
5	hardship. These arguments are all factual quarrels with the
6	agency's discretionary decision and the Court does not have
7	jurisdiction to review such arguments. Barco-Sandoval, 496
8	F.3d at 139; De La Vega v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 141, 144 (2d
9	Cir. 2006).
LO	For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
L1	DENIED, in part and DISMISSED, in part. As we have
L2	completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of
L3	removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending
L 4	
L5	request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in
L 6	accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
L7	34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(d)(1).
L8 L9 20	FOR THE COURT: Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

By: \_\_\_\_\_

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